Nationale und ubernationale Identitat im Kontext der europaischen Integrationen und der Globalisierung by Uroš PINTERIČ
NATIONAL AND
SUPRANATIONAL IDENTITY




Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana
UDK: 323.1(4-67 EU)
Pregledni rad
Primljeno: 15. 9. 2003.
In the last decade, there were many ideas about common
European identity in the context of the development and reform
of the European Union. Ideas are based on different elements of
common identity whether they exist or not. However, it is not so
easy to say that common European identity really exists. In this
article, the author will try to show in some old and new member
states of the European Union different components of national
identity and in this framework he will later define the same
elements in the system of the European Union as a political
system per se. There are some elements of national identity,
defined by different theories, also within the framework of the
European Union. However, based on the Eurobarometer we can
dismiss the idea of common European identity, which could be as
intensive as the national one. The process of globalization will
change the role of national identities and it will probably
strengthen supranational identities. However, national identities
will be still quite important because of their strong roots in society.
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INTRODUCTION
According to the process of creation and development of the
EuropeanUnionwe are facedwith the problem of shaping com-
mon supranational European identity. The process of shaping
supranational identity is one of the most crucial factors of fur-
ther development of the European Union. It works like link-401
 
age between different nations if it succeeds to become the real
identity of all Europeans. On the other hand, national identi-
ties can cause even the destruction of the European Union in
case of a serious crisis of European institutions and lack of
democratic legitimacy.
Identity, not important of what kind, is the essence, which
determines the action of an individual, state or supranational
formation (if there is any possibility to talk about common
identity in the framework of such a formation and not only
about the convergence of separate identities bound to the re-
presentatives of national states). Here it is important not to
overlook the role of identity in the development of the Eu-
ropean Union as a supranational political system.
The question of common European identity is not only
the question of homogenization of opinion and the feelings
of European "citizens" but also a question of further develop-
ment of the European Union. In this article we will define
some of the basic characteristics of national identity and then
we will try to find the same characteristics in the framework
of the European Union. Our thesis is that common European
identity in the sense of national identity does not exist. How-
ever, in the European Union the framework is not only the
sum of member states' national identities. In the process of
coexistence they are growing into quasi European identity.
We can prove this with the case when everyone is talking a-
bout common European identity existence, but on the other
hand this European identity breaks up into regional1 or even
national identities when some important difficulty occurs.
The most obvious case in recent years was in the field of com-
mon European foreign and security policy that fell apart when
the United States were searching for allies for the invasion of
Iraq.
NATIONAL IDENTITY
We can say that identity is the composition of psychophysical
characteristics upon which one individual differs from others
and in consequence these characteristics make every individ-
ual unique. Individual identity is a combination of genetic pre-
dispositions and environmental influence. On one hand there
is the geographical environment, with less (but not unimpor-
tant) influence and on the other hand there is the social envi-
ronment where the individual has been raised and is living
and which can very strongly influence the reactions of the
individual in different situations (Mlinar, 1995: 69; Ule, 2000).
Before we start thinking about national identity, we have
to pay some attention to social identitywhich is a broader frame-
work bound to the process of socialization and development








nation. Jenkins (1996: 5) in this context exposed reciprocity or
interactionism in recognizing an individual's identity. Nobo-
dy is able to recognize oneself, as part of a group if one's refe-
rence group is not wiling to recognize one's status within the
group.
In the sense of the historical battle for survival and Hob-
bes' concept of war of all against all, we can say that group i-
dentity was the consequence of group hunting of big animals,
or better, of the historical recognition that survival is much
easier if individuals are united as a group. When the first com-
munities (not necessarily political – in the beginning commu-
nities were created for easier and more successful survival)
were created, a common identity was created as well. This i-
dentity made people in one group more similar among them-
selves andmore different fromother groups (Ule, 2000: 177-178).
Development from tribe to nation is connected with the
appearance of different social-integrative factors, such as com-
mon religion, language (as a consequence of interpersonal com-
munication), shaping of common cultural tradition and in the
final phase of an individual's perception of themselves as mem-
bers of a group. However, Makarovi~ (1995: 211-213) under-
stands these integrative factors as necessary, but not sufficient
conditions for the creation of a nation as the basis of a nation-
al conscience. Makarovi~ (1995: 212) argues that a nation is
created when stratification takes place and an elite, which
starts to lead the people, is formed. But we have to state that
national identity is quite a recent phenomenon because it re-
ceives a more important role in the nineteenth century when
it escalates into a mass phenomenon (Dunkerley et al., 2002:
61) known also as "the spring of nations".2
National identity can be defined in a number of ways or
discussed in a number of aspects. On account of the turbulent
situation in the world, it seems necessary to pay some atten-
tion to the geopolitical definition. In this framework, nation-
al identity represents relations between states or territories
and includes concepts as threat, inferiority or superiority and
is connected to ideas on joint action against third states or cre-
ation of foreign policy (Dijking, 1996: 11). This concept of na-
tional identity is accompanied by strong feelings of belonging
to the group and separation into others and us; at the same
time it strengthens interpersonal ties inside the group. This
concept of national identity creation is connected to the states
and formations with strong assimilation potential. Dijking (1996:
10) presented a case in the USA and the feeling of "being A-
merican"3 in a New York suburb, compared to Ireland and the
feeling of "being European" in a suburb of Dublin, which was
much weaker than the former. According to this comparison







stronger than that of an Irishmanwho recognized himself first
as a member of the local community then of national state
and finally also as a member of the European Union (Dijking,
1996: 10).
The next, much more important, concept of national i-
dentity is the definition by Adam Smith. This definition will
also be used later in the article. As key factors Smith (1991: 14)
exposed historical territory, commonmyths and historical me-
mory, mass culture, common economy and common legal rights
and obligations for all members.
Each of these factors can be divided into more compo-
nents or concrete indicators such as common language, liter-
ature, symbolic institutions (in cultural as well as political and
economic fields),4 historical persons such as William Tell in
Switzerland, the flag, the anthem and others that can arouse
the feeling of interconnection and common belonging to the
same group (in Slovenia such is the case of the Triglav Moun-
tain and linden tree).
After a short theoretical discussion we can define some
criteria we will use in our analysis of some old and newmem-
ber states of the European Union and the existence of nation-
al identity in them for examining the existence of common Eu-
ropean identity.
We will use the following criteria5 (according to Smith,
1991: 14)
- Historical territory





- Common political institutions
- Common political actions against third countries
- Common symbols
With these criteria we will try to define the status of (su-
pra) national identity on the level of national states and on
the level of the European Union. Because of the nature of na-
tional identity creation, it is not enough just to say that these
criteria are present in the area of one state at the moment, but
they must be recognizable through a longer time period.
Different authors have different lists of criteria and pri-
orities, but it seems that many of them agree on the impor-
tance of languages in national identity creation. The most de-
tailed explanation is in the book of Benedict Anderson (1998):
Imagined Communities. He understands national identity as
a product of language and sentiment of interconnection be-








exist and have something in common (ability to communicate
in the same language). Similar is the argument of Brubaker
(n.d.), despite its specific case of Eastern Europe, when he is
talking about the role of language diversity and national con-
sciousness in the area of the Habsburg Empire in the time of
its decline. This social constructivism, based on the integra-
tive role of language, where people recognize each other as
members of the same community because of the same langu-
age that makes them able to understand each other, seems o-
ne of the most important approaches to national identity cre-
ation. Its validity can be found in the argument that national
identity is a product of interpersonal relations and communi-
cation (Anderson, 1998). However, we should not mix up i-
dentity with social role, evem though we have different
(more or less important) roles and different (more or less
strong) identities.6 In opposition to the "linguistic theory" are
some ideas of Hobsbawm (1996: 256), where he stresses that
there are many languages spoken by different nations and
also nations that speak different languages. In this context he
suggested quite a radical idea about the lowest denominator
of Anderson's "imagined communities". Hobsbawm (1996: 265)
argues that when someone can no longer feel oneself as a
member of any other group of people he/she recognizes him/
herself as a member of a nation. There is virtually nothing to
do to belong to it and it is almost impossible to be thrown out.
Most controversial is the argument that people create their
national (group) identity through xenophobia or exclusion of
others who never were and never will be able to becomemem-
bers of their nation or community (Hobsbawm, 1996: 265).7
Complementary to the defined criteria, there is also Ju-
`ni~'s (1981: 140-144) typology of the nation creation process.
In this context Ju`ni~ (1981: 140-144) differentiates three basic
ways of nation creation in relation with creation of national
state. The first type is the so-called state-nation, where on a
historically more or less unchanged territory common nation-
al identity was formed, and was connected to the existence of
the state. The second type (nation-state) is opposite to the
first one and in this case nation and national identity existed
before the formation of state and citizenship. Ju`ni~ (1981:
142) distinguishes here two subtypes. On one hand, there are
so-called separated nations where nation is divided between
two or more states because of the subdivision of one state and
on the other hand, there are nations without their own state
creating history (experience). The third type of creating nation
and national identity is the so-called "stateswithout nation". This
type is most common in states developed from former colo-







(1981: 142) has defined two subtypes again. The first one is
typical of colonized states when the nation-building tradition
was stopped and it was impossible to develop it into a mod-
ern national state after decolonization. The second subtype are
arbitrarily created states during colonialism, not taking into
account the different ethnic, cultural, language and other
specifications of people living in those areas. After decoloni-
zation, the existing borders with all their detriment concern-
ing nation-building in this area stayed unchanged (Ju`ni~, 1981:
142-143).
Different approaches described above more or less stress
the so-called modernist approach to identity creation, where
identity is connected with social structures (such as nation,
ethnicity, social class, etc.). In this case, the specific social group
is the core pillar of identity and individuals only take over the
most acceptable identity that helps them to live in a specific
relatively fixed environment (see Ule, 2000). In the case of the
postmodernist approach, identity is much more the concern
of independent individuals who can have many different
(even opposing) and much more flexible identities. This is
strongly connected to the process of globalization that with
time-space compression enables faster and more frequent "in-
teractions" between different "modernist" identities. Consequent-
ly, identities become more flexible and individuals are much
more prone to adjust or even change their identity according
to their environment. The ability of individuals to select a-
mong different identities enables them to live and work more
effectively in different environments. A specific case can be
connected with the so-called cosmopolite communitarism (see
Lacroix, 2002: 197-198), where individuals can adopt the gene-
ral framework and adjust or change their identity to the spe-
cifics of local environment.
Our randomly chosen four old and new member states
(Estonia, Slovenia, France and Great Britain) of the European
Union will be compared by the defined criteria with the Eu-
ropean Union as some kind of quasi-independent suprana-
tional entity.
COMPARISON AMONG CHOSEN STATES
Estonia
The area of the modern Estonia has been inhabited approxi-
mately since 7000BC. On this territory there were a number
of small independent states with elected chiefs. In the Middle
Ages, German crusaders were violently trying to Christianize
the population (The World Book Encyclopedia, 1992-1994, Vol. 6:








the object of different occupations and divisions between stron-
ger nations. This was a source of constant foreign cultural
influence. Basic Estonian national identity stayed untouched
only in the countryside, closed to the foreign cultural influ-
ence. It started to spread with national revival in the second
half of the nineteenth century (Uniwin, 1999: 152-156). Es-
tonia was an independent country from 1918 – 1939, but after
that period came under the Soviet Union (Uniwin, 1999: 151).
In 1991 Estonia became independent again. Only after 1991
Estonia has become capable of independent actions against
third states. Before it was always part of a greater political sys-
tem, where it had only limited autonomy. Despite violent as-
similation in the time of Soviet supremacy and plannedmain-
taining of economic underdevelopment, Estonia kept its own
language and cultural heritage as a consequence of relative
isolation from similar language groups and language differ-
ence from surrounding languages8 (Uniwin, 1999: 164). This
is one of the reasons why pressures of the Soviet Union and
violent assimilation did not succeed in destroying Estonian
national identity. In Estonia, despite the parliamentary sys-
tem, the president of the state has the important role of being
premier at the same time (see Constitution of the Republic of
Estonia, 1994). Today their identity is stressed in their consti-
tution (article 57) which states that the right to vote and be
elected goes only to the citizens of Estonia (Constitution of R
Estonia, 1994), excluding a large number of settled Russians,
who came there at the time of the Soviet Union's supremacy,
and strengthening the assimilation to Estonian culture.
Slovenia
The Slovenian area was already settled in times before Christ,
but South Slavs as direct progenitors came to this area around
500 AD. Despite quite late settlement, the Slavs created on
this territory an independent and democratic political entity
– Carantania – which was a sample for creating democratic sy-
stems even in some other states (Prunk, Ivani~, 1996: 18-27).
We can define Carantania as a first attempt at creating an en-
tity that could undertake common actions against third "sta-
tes" in that area. However, administrational decay in the Mid-
dle Ages disabled the efficient creation of a Slovenian nation-
al identity (Prunk, Ivani~, 1996: 28-36) and consequently re-
sulted in the inability of taking common actions against third
states. Slovenian national identity is based on numerous old
written sources such as "Bri`inski spomeniki", but the de facto
turning point in creating Slovenian national identity was the
Reformation and Trubar's "Katekizem" and "Abecednik" (as







that Slovenes were one of the first nations reading the Bible
in their own language (Prunk, Ivani~, 1996: 44-54). After the
Middle Ages, Slovenes maintained their own identity thro-
ugh their literature (Pre{eren, Cankar…). Literary works in
Slovenian history played not only an important cultural, but al-
so political role. Some of them became even symbols of Slo-
venian nationality. In the political field, the creation of nation-
al identity was bolstered by a political program, "zedinjena
Slovenija", written in 1848, which was finally realized in 1991
with the proclamation of sovereign Slovenia. This resulted in
the ability to take common actions against third states for the
first time after Carantania. In times past there was partial au-
tonomy that limited the capability of taking common actions
against third states. The development of Slovenia was eco-
nomically and politically marked by the long period of Habs-
burg supremacy and socialist Yugoslavia. In the framework of
the Habsburg monarchy, Slovenia received a comparative e-
conomic advantage, and from former Yugoslavia a stronger
feeling for social equity. A strong associative factor is also the
Catholic religion and the presence of different natural won-
ders, such as Triglav Mountain, Bohinj Lake or the linden tree,
which have the status of national symbols (The World Book En-
cyclopedia, 1992-1994, Vol. 17: 493-494). According to Ju`ni~'s
typology of nation creation we can list Slovenia as a country
where nationality was created before the state (government
structure).
France
Though the area of modern France was settled by Gauls al-
ready in times of ancient Rome, the name France has roots in
the Middle Ages when Franks broke into the West Roman
Empire and started to rule. However, common national iden-
tity of modern France started to develop in the sixteenth cen-
tury. France is the most usual example of a state-nation sys-
tem of creating national identity through the school and tax
systems imposed by the central governing structure. The pro-
blem of creating national identity this way is the heterogene-
ity of population, which is still aware of its roots (Bretons,
Corsicans). Because of this, there are ongoing disputes on the
role of sub-national identities. Seton-Watson (1977: 42) classi-
fies France as the so-called classical nation, where nationality
and statehood were created simultaneously. In times of the
French revolution religion was put aside while today, when
there is lot of Muslim immigrants, religion is not a strong fac-
tor of national identity. However, we cannot forget that in the
Middle Ages, France was Christian and for some years even








not possible to talk about common actions against third states.
However, there already were coalitions built on the principle
of military power balance and needs (Seton-Watson, 1977: 61-
-65). The beginning of common actions against third states can
be dated into a time of first colonial expansion and centrali-
zation of government in the sixteenth century (Seton-Watson,
1977: 65-66). A strong central political government and sym-
bols of the French revolution connected to it, encouraged na-
tionalism and the idea of the supremacy of French language
over others. This still helps tomaintain "homogeneity" in France,
despite different separatist tensions. Also important is France's
economic power (France is one of seven economically most
affluent states in the world) and at the same time a nuclear
and space power (The World Book Encyclopedia, 1992-1994,
Vol. 7: 391-419). According to Ju`ni~'s (see Ju`ni~, 1981: 140-
-144) typology of state development, we can classify France as
a classical state-nation type, where national consciousness de-
veloped in the context of an already existing political entity.
Great Britain
The British islands were settled already in the early Stone Age.
The name Britain is rooted in the times of Julius Caesar's con-
quests. He founded tribeswith themonarchic order and named
the province Britannia. Britain was importantly marked by the
dark Middle Ages, the plague, Viking invasions, imperialism,
the loss of the American colonies in North America, and in
recent times industrial revolution. The British tradition of e-
volutive legal and political praxis that created today's Great
Britain has roots in documents such as 'Habeas Corpus' and
'Bill of Rights'. Great Britain is a parliamentary monarchy with-
out a written constitution and is an important example of go-
verning a system on the basis of a special state arrangement.
Common actions against third states appeared quite late, which
is connected with the decline of the British islands (see Seton-
-Watson, 1977: 43-49). The basis for a strong monarchy, capa-
ble of joint action against third states was the development of
English language (Seton-Watson, 1977: 49). Until the end of
the nineteenth century, common actions against third states
were more or less limited to imperial conquests and relations
among the colonies and the parent archipelago. Only after
the Second World War and decolonization, colonial relations
started to change into international. However, relations in the
so-called Commonwealth were still more frequent compared
to the rest of the world (see Repe, 1998). Despite English be-
ing the most important world language, British citizens have
no special relation to it. The most important symbols are the







story of the colonial superpower and their economic devel-
opment. The most disintegrative factors in Great Britain are
religion and ideas regarding increased autonomy for local en-
tities such as Scotland and Wales (The World Book Encyclopedia,
1992-1994, Vol. 20: 42-159), which is a consequence of a strong
active presence of influential regional identities (see Seton-Wat-
son, 1977: 43-61). According to Ju`ni~'s typology, Great Britain,
as does France, represents a classical case when nation was
created within the framework of the political system.
We can assume that all four briefly described countries
have autonomous state institutions and processes on a de-
fined historical territory through a longer period of time.9 In
all four countries, we can find independent economies which,
with the common European market and the processes of glo-
balization, are losing their role. Religious tradition differs from
country to country, but in all four we can recognize the role
of Christianity. Cultural differences are connected to the geo-
graphic location and historical development of each nation.
The most problematic element is language, where we can see
great differences10 among as within states. However, it is ob-
vious that, especially in small countries, languagewas themost
important factor of national identity creation, because there
was no other specific integrative factor that could create the
effect of the so-called imagined community (Anderson, 1998).
In cases of greater states there were and still are also other fac-
tors, such as long historical memory, strong political system
and long time of relatively sovereign control over territory.
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS IDENTITY
Dreams about a joint Europe are as old as Europe itself, but
the main problemwas in the way to realize these dreams (Pin-
teri~, 2002: 415). From the historical perspective, Europe is a
continent of conflicts and differences based on strong nation-
al feelings and the idea of one nation's supremacy over oth-
ers. After the Second World War, there has been a completely
new approach to the unification of the Old continent. The
attempt to subjugate other nations under one head, was re-
placed by economic cooperation and creating networks of co-
operation among states. This helped to suppress negative fee-
lings at least on a formal level.
Themost important characteristic of the creation of a com-
mon European identity is its top-down formation.11 In fact, it
is all about connecting economic interests of nation states and
the spill-over effect, which has homogenized other policy fields
as well. Here, we should not forget the role of the European
institutional framework, the creation of different common









From a historical and cultural point of view, we can talk
about some common characteristics of uniform European cul-
ture marked by Christianity, ancient Greek and Roman civi-
lization and their achievements, ideas of French revolution
and the experience of both world wars. On the other hand,
Europe is divided by consequences of self-sufficient feudal
units in the Middle Ages and nationalisms of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries (Dunkerley et al., 2002: 110-116). Ac-
cording to this, we can say that the so-called common Euro-
pean identity is not only a concept to put people into some
kind of common form based on an institutional framework,
but this common identity really has some historical backgro-
und. This background can be assumed as the basis for the cre-
ation of a common European identity in future by the bottom
up method, when people recognize their roots and can feel
they belong to a broader group (in this case to the European
"quasi-nation"), especially in relation to non-European nations.
Linguistic diversity is one of the main barriers in the pro-
cess of creating a common European identity. Language is o-
ne of the strongest factors in the national identity creation
process. Anderson (1998) understands it as the basis for na-
tional identity creation. The European Union has many more
languages than member states, if we are not afraid to recog-
nize languages of different national minorities with strong
national identity, as independent ones (Basques, theWelsh…).
According to some data in the European Union, there are thir-
ty-two nations and sixty-seven languages, without taking in
account dialects (Borneman, Fowler in Dunkerley et al., 2002:
121). In this case, if we agree with Anderson's concept of ima-
gined communities, we can recognize sixty-seven different
(sub) national identities.
Some data on the existence of a common European iden-
tity can be found in the Eurobarometer European public opi-
nion polls. Questions regarding the feeling of belonging to
the European Union, the possibility of the existence of a com-
mon European cultural identity and the presence of a com-
mon European identity show quite a heterogenic picture a-
mong citizens of different member states and an outstanding
lack of unity among Great Britain and continental Europe. A
low level of European identity12 and a diametrically opposite
high level of national identity is characteristic of Great Britain,
Scandinavian states and Greece. In accordance with this, it is
hard to say that a common European identity exists (see Fer-
fila, 2002: 505-507). Also surprising is the level of agreement
on common cultural identity, because there is no European
member state where at least half of the people could agree







member states, more than half of the respondents think that
there is no common European culture (see Ferfila, 2002: 507).
The same situation exists among European scientists and
politicians who have many different views regarding a com-
mon European identity. It is noted that common identity is
necessary, and national identities should be protected in some
kind of middle ground between these two poles in the image
of so-called "cosmopolite communitarism" (Lacroix, 2002: 197-
-198). Cosmopolite communitarism otherwise is a broader con-
cept of understanding individual identity in the context of
globalization, which is not directly connected to the Euro-
pean Union, but is usable also in this concrete case. In the case
of the European use of this concept it means a high level of
agreement among states on basic issues and values on one
hand, and national specifics on the other hand (Lacroix, 2002:
201-203), which seems most similar to the modern situation in
the European Union.
The process of creating a common European identity with
a strong impact of institutional framework was even more
specified with the establishment of common European citi-
zenship13 in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The formulation,
stating that from the Maastricht Treaty on, citizens of every
European Union member state are also citizens of the Euro-
pean Union, was written so awkwardly that it was necessary
to amend it in the Amsterdam Treaty, where it was stressed that
national citizenship still remains the basic citizenship (Weiler,
1999: 324).
Taking into account all the basic components of common
European identity gives us quite a confused picture connect-
ed to the historical elements of common culture (Greek and
Roman culture and Christian religion) versus the disintegra-
tive "spring of nations" (when Europe, from self-sufficient fe-
uds, became a puzzle of national states and numerous nation-
alisms, which in the first half of twentieth century escalated
into the two bloodiest wars ever). After the SecondWorldWar
we are witnesses of unifying tensions as the answer to fears
of the next possible conflict, due to national interests.
According to the Eurobarometer public opinion polls (Eu-
robarometer 60, Autumn 2003), we can argue that at the mo-
ment, it is unrealistic to say that some kind of common Eu-
ropean feeling exists among European nations. More or less,
at the moment, the system revolves around different institu-
tional mechanisms such as common institutional framework,
common policies, European citizenship and how to create it.
Here, we should bear in mind the role of the common Euro-
pean currency – Euro. It got the nickname "our money" quick-








grative factor of the European Union and at the same time it
seems to be also the greatest symbol of the unified European
Union (Dunkerley et al., 2002: 118). However, it is important
to note that all European Union member states are not auto-
matically member states of the European Monetary Union
and that they did not necessarily give up their national cur-
rency, despite being members of the European Monetary U-
nion. Two other symbols of the European Union are the flag
and anthem, which, with other elements, are trying to con-
vince the world and even citizens of its own member states,
that a common European identity does exist.
On the other hand, we can oppose the existence of a
common European identity, especially when we take into con-
sideration the common actions of concluded territory (with
population) against third states. This is most obvious in the
defense and foreign policy field, where European Unionmem-
ber states are far from unanimous. This was most recently ob-
vious when the USAwas searching for support to attack Iraq.14
No matter if we are talking about national or suprana-
tional identity, today we are not allowed to forget the impact
of globalization. Different definitions of globalization give us
different points of view. In our case, we will say that globali-
zation is a process of time and space compression (see Lar-
rain, 1994: 150-154). In relation to national identities this means
one can no longer be safe from more frequent interactions
with other identities. It is obvious that there is much more
possibility for mixing different cultures and their elements. In
this sense we can say that Hobsbawm's (1996: 265) idea about
protecting national identity with xenophobia can be verified,
but that at the same time globalization is a process of over-
throwing xenophobic barriers. Discussion on identity in con-
ditions of globalization leads in several directions. We have
already mentioned cosmopolitanism; the second one is pan-
nationalism, followed by new local identities. In case of the
European Union, pan-nationalism can be understood as so-
-called pan-Europeanism, which unites different units (na-
tions) into a common political and cultural community on the
basis of common characteristics. It can be understood almost
as a federative model, trying to create a totally new (id)entity.
On the other hand, there are few models of linking broader
(supranational) and local identities. This "glocal" mix is quite
similar to cosmopolitanism where supranational common cha-
racteristics are joined with characteristics of local identity. The
main barrier for such "glocal" identity is in rare common ele-
ments on the supranational (global) level, if we skip world
wars and colonialism, which are far from being a good basis







(see Lu~i}, 2003) agree that national identity will change its
form and role in the process of globalization and strengthen-
ing of the European Union. On the other hand, except ex-
tremists, they also agree that the role of the national will not
vanish and that it will stay important and recognizable (see
also Larrain, 1994: 154-166).
In this context, it seems we should also understand the
"real" concept of the common European identity as a flexible
mix of different local, national and regional identities. In ac-
cordancewith the cosmopolite communitarism theorywe should
understand common European identity as the core value sys-
tem common to all nations of the European Union upgraded
with a flexible part of identity based on preferences of every
individual. This flexible part of identity will probably be strong-
ly connected with the individual's national identity but at the
same time it will be more flexible due to the individual's chan-
ces of changing the environment and adjusting to the habits
of the new environment. This flexibility of individuals, con-
nected with space-time compression (globalization) and ab-
sence of national borders in the European Union will weaken
national identities over time and create a common European
identity.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between national and supranational identi-
ty could be discussed without any remark on the influence of
other factors. However, forgetting about the basic psycholog-
ical statements on the identity of every individual, creation
and changing of identity, would be at the very least incorrect.
A system of shaping individual identity is, in the first place,
strongly connected to the system of near social reference
frameworks such as family, local community and, only in the
context of these two reference groups does indirect consci-
ence of belonging to a broader entity begin. This broader enti-
ty is usually called "nation", which differs from other similar
entities by its common language, tradition, and lower or high-
er degree of openness towards other nations. Consciousness
of belonging to a broader political entity (usually national
state) is called national identity, which is, on one hand, col-
lective (in the sense of existence of integrative factors which
an individual recognizes as important for the existence and
development of national identity) and on the other hand in-
dividual (in the sense of every individual's self-recognition of
this identity).
In this article, based on randomly chosen old and new
European Union member states, we tried to show that in the








al identity differing from others by values of defined indica-
tors of national identity. In the article, we find out that the
problem is much more complex than it seems at first glance.
In some states, there are strong subnational identities connec-
ted to the minorities (Bretons) and oppose the thesis on the
existence of national states with a common national identity.
On the other hand, there is the strong impact of a common
history on the European continent connected to the influence
of the Roman Empire and Christian religion in most Europe-
an states, which interconnects nations even today. However,
one must be aware that this analysis was to a great extent ba-
sed on the modernistic approach to identity.
At the same time, we paid attention to the possible exis-
tence of a common European identity, which is often stressed
by current politics. According to indicators of common (natio-
nal) identity we can say that within the framework of the
European Union, there exist at least partly common institu-
tions, policies, history and tradition, a faith in common demo-
cratic values, symbols and religious foundations. In fact, the
only thing that is far from being common is language. Despite
these indicators speaking in favor of some kind of common
European identity, public opinion polls in the European Uni-
on member states show quite a different picture, where there
is no significant track of common European identity or rather,
the sense of individual national identities is much stronger.
As it was said before, this analysis is based on a modernistic
approach to the concept of identity. In parts of the article where
we were trying to think about common European identity
through the postmodernistic approach we could find a much
greater chance for the development of common European
identity based on the common value system and more flexi-
ble identities connected to individuals and not to different so-
cial structures.
Is the main reason for this situation in the old biblical
story about the Tower of Babylon, in the languages that be-
came the main barrier to building it? Probably not. With re-
gard to the importance of the thesis of individual socializa-
tion, it seems much more reasonable that European identity
is just one of the identities of every individual. When we
accept this, we also have to accept that there must be some
kind of hierarchy of identities, where quickly adopted identi-
ties have a stronger impact than others and are usually con-
nected to the local community. This identity is then followed
by national and supranational identities.16 It may be added
that the process of a common European identity is, at best,
fifty years old, when today's national identities have a histo-







element of a national identity's strength is its former history.
According to Eurobarometer data, countries with a longer and
"more famous" history have a stronger national identity than
younger nations.17
To conculde, it seems much more reasonable talking a-
bout the existence of this or other identity (especially com-
mon European identity) than talking about the presence of dif-
ferent elements of common identity at a certain level.
In the case of the European Union, the relation between
institutional system and (supra) national identity can be un-
derstood as coexistence and reciprocal conditioning of both
(institutional and identity) concepts. Much more common are
situations where the state is created on the basis of national
identity. On the other hand, there are political systems (usu-
ally quite centralized), which are trying to create a common
identity through the common policies imposed on the (supra)
national level.18
All these arguments are in favor of @agar's (1998: 27) idea
about the interweaving of different identities. But at the same
time, a greater social problem arises when these interweaving
identities are put into the context of globalization. In the case
of the European Union we can see that effects of globalization
and Europeanization will have long-term consequences con-
cerning national identities and will probably create some
kind of common European identity. We can say that the pro-
cess of globalization will change (but not suppress) the role of
national identities in relation to supranational and local ones.
However, we will still be asking ourselves who and what we
are, where we are from and where we are going to.
NOTES
1 Regional refers to South Europe, Scandinavian states, British Isles,
Central European states…
2 Spring of nations is historical label for escalation of different na-
tionalisms in European continent in 1848 connected to the February
and March revolution.
3 We have to be careful when talking about being American – we
must not forget that America is the biggest melting pot and the only
people who are allowed to call themselves Native Americans are In-
dians.
4 National parliament, national bank, national gallery, museums, o-
pera... the scope of institutions differs from state to state.
5 We are aware that this list is far from complete and represents just
the most common national identity criteria.
6 Social role is what I do in my life; on the other hand, identity is
answering the question of belonging and feeling sympathy with a
specific group. In some cases role and identity can overlap.








8 Estonian language is Ugrofinnic, and it was surrounded by Slavic
languages which are very different.
9 We have to notice that Slovenia and Estonia have a long tradition
of nationality, but a really independent state is for both countries
quite a new thing.
10 English is a special branch of the German language group, French
is one of the Romanic languages; Slovene is (South) Slavic and E-
stonian an Ugrofinnic language (Ju`ni~, 1983).
11 In this segment it is similar to the creation of French identity,
which was created by central government with a common educa-
tion system and some other policies.
12 In Luxembourg 20% of the people consider themselves as Euro-
peans in the first place and then Luxembourgian, in other states the
percentage of people considering themselves as Europeans is much
lower (See Ferfila, 2002: 506).
13 For some critical reflections on this topic see also Cesarain and Ful-
brook (ed.), 1996.
14 See Anti~, 2002: 14.
15 For some more basic ways of identity development in the era of
globalization see Lu~i} (2003).
16 On multilevel of individual's identity and role of national and
supranational identities see also @agar, 1998: 27-33.
17 See before: footnote 10: case Luxembourg.
18 Such examples are France and the European Union.
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Nacionalni i nadnacionalni identitet
u kontekstu europske integracije
i globalizacije
Uro{ PINTERI^
Fakultet dru{tvenih znanosti, Ljubljana
U posljednjem desetlje}u bilo je mnogo zamisli o zajedni~kom
europskom identitetu u kontekstu razvoja i reformi Europske
unije. Te se zamisli zasnivaju na ~imbenicima zajedni~kog
identiteta, postojali oni ili ne. Me|utim, ne mo`e se samo tako
re}i da zajedni~ki europski identitet stvarno postoji. U ovom
~lanku pisac }e poku{ati pokazati u nekim starim i novim
zemljama ~lanicama Europske unije razli~ite sastavnice
nacionalnog identiteta te }e unutar tog okvira kasnije definirati
iste sastavnice u sustavu Europske unije kao politi~koga
sustava per se. Neki elementi nacionalnog identiteta,
definirani raznim teorijama, postoje i u okviru Europske unije.
Ipak, na temelju eurobarometra mo`emo isklju~iti zamisao o
zajedni~kom europskom identitetu koji bi mogao biti tako jak
poput nacionalnoga. Tijek globalizacije promijenit }e ulogu
nacionalnih identiteta te vjerojatno oja~ati nadnacionalne
identitete. No nacionalni identiteti bit }e jo{ uvijek dosta va`ni
zbog svojih ~vrstih korijena u dru{tvu.
Nationale und übernationale Identität
im Kontext der europäischen
Integrationen und der Globalisierung
Uro{ PINTERI^
Gesellschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Ljubljana
Im Laufe des letzten Jahrzehnts wurden viele Ideen über die
gemeinsame europäische Identität im Kontext der
Entwicklung und Reformierung der Europäischen Union
vorgebracht. Diese Ideen gründen sich auf verschiedenen







nicht. Selbst hinsichtlich der gemeinsamen europäischen
Identität kann man nicht so ohne weiteres sagen, ob sie
tatsächlich auch existiert. In diesem Artikel möchte der
Verfasser am Beispiel einiger alter und neuer EU-
Mitgliedsstaaten die unterschiedlichen Bestandteile nationaler
Identität aufzeigen und später in diesem Rahmen ebendiese
Bestandteile innerhalb der EU als eines politischen Systems
per se definieren. Einige Elemente nationaler Identität, wie
sie gemäß verschiedenen Theorien definiert werden,
existieren auch innerhalb der EU. Dennoch kann man
aufgrund des Eurobarometers den Gedanken einer
gemeinsamen europäischen Identität, die in ihrer Stärke
einer nationalen Identität gleichkäme, ausschließen. Der
Verlauf der Globalisierung wird die Rolle nationaler
Identitäten verändern und wahrscheinlich übernationale
Identitäten erstarken lassen. Nationale Identitäten werden
wegen ihrer festen Verwurzelung in der Gesellschaft jedoch
auch weiterhin von ziemlich großer Bedeutung sein.
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